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NOTE

THE FARMER AS MERCHANT UNDER THE U.C.C.

I. INTRODUCTION
The American farmer is an indispensable element of the American economy. He plays a dual role in the commercial world. On the
one hand, the typical farm operator consumes a huge dollar amount
of farm equipment, farm supplies and personal services annually. On
the other hand, he supplies the agricultural raw materials upon which
most of the American public depends for food and clothing.' The purchase and sale transactions in which the average farmer engages in
the course of performing both roles bring him frequently into contact
with article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).2 That article defines the rights and obligations which apply to all parties,
purchasers and vendors, to a commercial sales contract in almost
every American jurisdiction.' The exact scope of the responsibilities
of farmers under article 2 is currently the subject of some dispute.
That dispute stems from a difference of opinion as to the proper interpretation and application of one of the fundamentally important
concepts of article 2, that of the merchant.
1. The tremendous impact of the farming
Illustrated by the following statistics:
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STATES: 1975 at xiX (96th ed. 1975).
2. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Uniform Commercial Code shall
be to the 1972 Official Text [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]
3. The U.C.C. has been enacted in every state in the United States, with the exception
of Louisiana. See U.C.C. Table 1 at XXXV.
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Section 2-104 (1) describes three categories of merchants, each
having distinct criteria. 4 Thirteen other sections spread throughout
article 2 incorporate one or more of those categories into their provisions, which impose obligations upon merchants to which nonmerchants are not subject., The question of whether those additional
duties should be imposed upon individuals involved in the production
and sale of farm products has been faced squarely by ten courts.6
It has arisen under several article 2 sections; namely, section
2-201 (2) 's modification of the Statute of Frauds,7 the offer and acceptance rules of section 2-207,s and the warranty of merchantability
provisions of section 2-314. 9
This note, by examination of the background of the merchant provisions and the existing case law, will attempt to provide some general principles for determining the status of a person engaged in a
typical farming operation. This note will also examine some of the
policy grounds upon which a decision on this issue might rest.
4.

U.C.C. § 2-104(1) states:
"Merchant" means a person who deals In goods of the kind or otherwise
by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skl'l peculiar
to the practices or goods Involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or
other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out has having such
knowledge or skill.
5. The Increased obligations placed upon "merchants" are as follows: good faith requirement, § 2-103; Statute of Frauds, § 2-201; firm offers, § 2-205 ; acceptance of counter
offers, § 2-207(2) ; oral modification and rescission, § 2-209(2) ; warranty of merchantability, § 2-314; return of purchased items, § 2-327(1) (c) ; retention of possession by seller, §
2-402(2) ; entrustment, § 2-403; risk of loss, § 2-509(3) ; duties of buyer upon rejection,
§ 2-603; basis for rejection, § 2-605(1) (b) ; right to adequate assurance of performance,
§ 2-609(1), (2).
6. Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972) ; Continental Grain Co.
v. Brown, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 52 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 1976) ; Continental Grain Co. v. Harbach,
400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D- 111.1975) ; Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199
(1975) ; Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965) ; Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Il1. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975) ; Campbell v. Yokel, 20 Il.
App. 3d 702, 313
N.E.2d 628 (1974) ; Decatur Coop. Ass'n. v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976) ; Ohio
Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 318 N.E.2d 428 (1973) ; Lish v. Compton,
Utah 2d, 547 P.2d 223 (1976). Although the Issue has not been squarely faced in
North Dakota, dicta In a recent case Indicates that the North Dakota Supreme Court
recognizes the problem and is prepared to deal with it. See Farmer's Coop Ass'n
of
Churches Ferry v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808, 814 (N.D. 1976).
7. U.C.C. § 2-201 provides in part as follows:
Between merchants If within a reasonable time a writing In confirmation
of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of
subsection (1)
against such party unless written notice of objection to Its
contents is given within 10 days after it is received.
8. U.C.C. § 2-207 provides in part as follows:
(1)
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which Is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance
even though It states terms additional to or different from those offered
or agreed upon, unless acceptLnce is expressly made conditional on assent
to the additional or different terms.
(2)
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to
the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless :
(a)
the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c)
notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
9. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) states as follows:

NOTE

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.C.C. AND ITS MERCHANT PROVISIONS
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.C.C.

The development of the U.C.C. was undertaken in an effort to
provide a modern substitute for the early uniform commercial laws,
which had become obsolete. 10 The drafters of the Code had several
general objectives in mind when they began work. The first was to
design a scheme of laws flexible enough to keep abreast of constantly changing business practices." The second was to encourage a decision-making process based on a thorough examination of the merits
of each case rather than on a "pigeon-holing" approach." The final
general objective was to place the primary burden of risk and responsibility involved in a sales transaction on the "professional" party to the transaction.13 The drafters placed that risk on the professional parties by imposing upon them special duties and obligations
to which non-professionals are not subject. The scheme of cataloguing
the special responsibilities of professionals was designed to provide a
smooth, efficient method for resolving disputes which often arise in
the normal course of commercial transactions. 4 The U.C.C. concept
of merchant was designed to describe the members of the class of
professionals to whom the scheme was intended to apply. 15
B. THE MERCHANT PROVISIONS

The first appearance of the merchant provisions in the drafts of
the U.C.C. caused some consternation among commentators."6 No
body of law prior to the U.C.C. had attached any legal significance
to the distinction between merchants and nonmerchants." As a result
there were few points of reference to which a court could turn for
guidance in filling out the legal concept of merchant.
The drafters were criticized for using a word that had a strong
common understanding to describe a unique legal concept which in
Unless
excluded or modified
(Section 2-316), a, warranty
that the
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is
a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed, either on the premises or

goods

elsewhere is a sale.
10. F. WHITNEY, THE LAW OF MODERN COMMERCIAL PRAC'rICE §.111, at 149 (1958).
11. Kripke, Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 13G2
U. ILL. L.F. 321, 330.
12. Id. at 328.
13. Id. at 324-25.
14. U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 1.
15. Kripke, supra note 11, at 325.
16. Kripke states as follows: "The extra duty put on the professional may well be
reasonable, but I still feel that the method of achieving It through an artificial definition
of shifting meaning ts dangerous and undesirable ..
" Kripke, supra note 11, at 326.
See also Williston, The Proposed Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561, 572 (1950).
17. 67 Am. JUR. 2d, Sales, § 14 at 125, n.3 (2d ed. 1973).
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many respects was very different from that common understanding."8 One commentator feared that intuitive feelings for the word
"merchant" could interfere with the proper development of the legal
concept,19 and that the merchant provisions would be difficult to ap0
ply to many situations.2
Several different opinions on the correct interpretation of the merchant concept emerged from those early discussions of the provisions.
One of the principal drafters of article 2, Karl Llewellyn, said as follows: "The whole law, . . . -and the whole current effort to establish . . . 'uniform' interpretations . . . -and the whole current successful movement to build . . . 'standard terms'-all of these rest
on a vital need for distinguishing merchants from housewives, and
from farmers, and from mere Lawyers.- 21 Homer Kripke, in a review of a meeting with the drafting committee, emphasized the fact
that another of the chief drafters, Sonia Mentschikoff, took a position
quite different from that of Llewellyn.
If you throw the emphasis on "goods" a merchant is a person who deals with a particular kind of thing. . . If you
throw the emphasis on practices, you reach the conclusion
that a commercial lawyer is a merchant with respect to all
kinds of sales, or that a professional purchasing agent in a
corporation is a merchant as to all kinds of goods, whether
or not he has ever dealt with the particular kind of goods involved. Miss Mentschikoff
makes it clear to me that that in
22
fact is her intention.
The clearest conception of the proper scope of the merchant provisions was proposed by a group other than the drafting committee.
Certain members of the Harvard Law School faculty stated that it
was their belief that application of the merchant provisions should
cause very little confusion because merchant status should be placed
upon everyone involved in the conduct of general business, unless to
do so would result in some element of "harshness" or "unfair sur23
prise."
18.

One commentator has stated as follows:
There is much "old soil" attached to the word "merchant." Clearly the
drafters meant to define "merchant" in some unique ways and expected
courts and lawyers to aqulesce. Most people would certainly agree that interpretation of a statutory term should begin with the statutory definition.
However, it should have been expected that old definitions of a,common term
would be resurrected, particularly when the comments often refer to other
meanings.
Newell, The Merchant of Article 2, 7 VAL. L. REV. 307, 314 (1973).
19. Id.
20. Williston, supra note 16, at 572.
21. Newell, supra note 18, at 208-09, quoting 1 N.Y. REP. OF THE LAW REV. COMM'N
FOR

1954

AND

RECORD

OF

HEARINGS

ON

THE

UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE

107-0S

(1954)

(emphasis added).

22. Hearing Before an Enlarged Editorial Board, Jan. 27-29, 1951, 6 Bus. LAW. 161.
183 (1951).
23. Report on Article 2-Sales by Certain Members of Faculty of Harvard Law School,
6 Bus. LAW. 151, 154 (1951).

NOTE

The drafters of the U.C.C. have grouped the thirteen article 2
sections which utilize the merchant concept into three general categories, based on the particular characteristic of "merchant" which
the section is designed to emphasize. 24 Group I, consisting of sections 2-201 (2), 2-205, 2-207 (2), and 2-209 (2), places emphasis on the
individual's knowledge of the practices involved in the transaction. 25
Group II, consisting of sections 2-314 (1), 2-402 (2), and 2-403 (2), emphasizes the defendant's "professional status as to a particular kind
of good. ' ' 28 Group III, consisting of sections 2-103 (1) (b), 2-327 (1) (c),
2-509 (3), 2-603, 2-605 (1) (b), and 2-609 (2), includes individuals who
have either special knowledge of the practices or of the goods or
27
both.
Section 2-104 (1) breaks down the category of merchant into three
subclasses. The first two subclasses are the basis of the grouping
of U.C.C. sections by the drafters of the Code. The third subclass is
merely a special application of the second subclass.
1. Dealers in Goods of the Kind
The first type of merchant is one who "deals in goods of the
kind." ' 28 "Deal" is the word chosen to describe the "professional -status" with respect to goods. The language appears straightforward
upon first reading. The main question posed by this description is
what activity constitutes dealing and makes the actor a dealer within the meaning of the section. There are several very general guidelines to interpretation of this section. The official comments indicate
that a "casual seller" is not a merchant. 29 Likewise, a person who
makes an "isolated sale" is not a dealer. 30 "Goods of the kind" probably includes any products sold within the general category in which
the individual has been dealing. 31
The courts have had little difficulty applying the label of dealer
to individuals involved in the sale of goods on a daily or "continuous"
basis, such as wholesalers and retailers. 32 The decisions in cases
24. U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
29. U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 1.
30. U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 3.
31. Anderson states as follows: "The limiting concept of being a merchant 'with respect
to goods of the kind' is to be liberally construed so as to embrace any products that are
sold within the general category in which the defendant had been dealing."
SON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-314:61, at 581 (2d ed. 1970).

32.
1971),

In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co., 326 F.

1 R.

ANDER-

Supp. 504 (W.D. Mo.

the court stated as follows: "Thus it is obvious that Standard as the . . . continuous

seller of cheese is a 'merchant'...."
Newton-Waltham

Id.

at 509 n.12.

(emphasis added').

Likewise, in

Bank & Trust Co. v. Bergen Motors, Inc., 68 Misc. 2d 228, 327 N.Y.S.2d

77 (1971), the court states as follows: "A merchant is one who engages in
economio enterprise on a systematic basis, not merely an isolated transaction". Id.
, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 80 (emphasis added).

an
at
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involving those types of defendants, though, have not developed any
real guidelines for determining what activity constitutes dealing. The
opinions are often written in a manner which provides little opportunity for extension of the holding beyond the exact facts of the case.
The existing judicial discussion of this issue frequently consists of no
more than a quote of section 2-104 (1), a recitation of the defendant's
background, and the conclusory statement that he is a merchant. 3
The opinions rarely cite other authority in support of their conclusions.
2. He Who by His Occupation Holds Himself Out as Having
Skill or Knowledge Peculiar to the Practices or Goods
Involved in the Transaction
The second type of merchant is one who "by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction.

' 34

Conceptually, there

are numerous ways to interpret this definition by the use of different combinations of the words "practices," "goods," and "skill," 3 5
with each interpretation theoretically leading to a slightly different
result. These subtle differences notwithstanding, it i's evident that
this category was intended to consist of two major subdivisions. One
subdivision consists of persons who have specialized knowledge of a
particular type of good. The-other subdivision consists of persons
who have specialized knowledge with respect to a particular type of
38
transaction.
In order to be classified as a merchant in this category, an individual must represent "by his occupation" that he has the requisite specialized knowledge. The two inquiries under this category,
then, must be: (a) what qualifications or restrictions were intended
to be imposed by the words, "by his occupation"?; and (b) when
does an individual by his occupation hold himself out as having knowledge or skill?
The case law applying the merchant provisions provides no general principles from which the answer to either question can be derived.3 7 The most reasonable inference is that the phrase "by his
33. Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 629 (W.D. Ky. March 31, 1972) (sellers
of seed corn held to be merchants) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Crane, -Ind.
App.- , 301
N.E.2d 378 (1973)
(seller of logs held to be a merchant) ; Woodruff v. Clark City Farm
Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972) (a "regular" seller of chickens held to be a merchant); Rose v. Epley Motor Sales, -N.C.-,
215 S.E.2d 573
(1975) (a used car dealer held to be a merchant) ; Allen v. Savage Arms Corp., 52 Luzerne Leg. Reg. Rep. 159, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 975 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, Luzerne County,
Mar. 22, 1962) (hardware store proprietor held to be a merchant); Caudle v. Sherrad
Motor Co., 525 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1975) (seller of automobiles and house trailers held to be
a merchant).
34. U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
35. Newell, supra note 18, at 315.
36. U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 2.
37. See generally Mercanti v. Perrson, 160 Conn. 468, 280 A.2d 137 (1971); Williams
v.*Western Sur., 6 Wash. App. 300, 492 P.2d 596 (1972).

NOTE

occupation" requires reference only to the activity from which
the actor derives the major portion of his livelihood.3 8 The comments
indicate that a mere casual seller is,not to be considered a merchant3 9 It has been suggested that the words "by his occupation"
should operate to exclude only those persons who engage in a par40
ticular activity merely as a hobby.
An individual, for the purposes of this definition, represents that
he possesses skill or knowledge peculiar to the practices or goods
involved merely by being engaged in an occupation which involves
contact with the particular goods or practices during the normal
course of business. An objective standard is used to determine whether a representation of special knowledge has been made. 41 In other
words, the actual knowledge or experience of the person in question
is irrelevant. 42 Furthermore, the comments emphasize the fact that
a person who is a merchant because he "by his occupation" represents that he has knowledge with respect to certain practices or
goods associated with that particular occupation, does not thereby
become a merchant with respect to goods or practices not ordinarily
associated with that occupation, even if he has actual knowledge or
skill with respect to those goods or practices, or claims to have actual knowledge. That is, a person engaging in transactions that are
outside the scope of his mercantile capacity is not a merchant with
4
respect to those transactions. 3
The "practices" and "goods" portion of the description is to be
liberally construed, with reference to the particular article 2 sections
involved in a controversy. 44 The "practices" are very common business customs such as opening and answering mail. "Goods of the
kind" probably includes any item within the general category of
45
goods with which the individual commonly works.
3. Employment of an Agent, Broker, or Other Intermediary
Who by His Occupation Holds Himself Out as Having Such
Knowledge or Skill
Essentially, anyone who engages an agent who would be a merchant under the definition 'of the second category of merchant be3S. "Occupation" is not defined in the U.C.C. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY provides this
definition: "That which principally takes up one's time, thought, and energies; especially,
one's regular business or employment; also whatever one follows as the means of making
a livelihood". BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
39. U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 1.
40. Newell, supra note 18, at 325.
41.

1

R.

ANDERSON,

UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE,

§

2-104:7,

at

220

(2d

ed.

1970)

N'ewell, supra note 18, at 325.
42.

1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 41, at § 2-104:7, at 220.

43.

U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 4 ; 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 41, at § 2-314:62, at 581.

44.

U.C.C.

§

2-104,

Comment

2.

For a

detailed

discussion

Individual sections, see Newell, supra note 18, at 335-43.
45. See 1 It. ANDERSON, supra note 41, at § 2-314:61, at 581.

of

the

importance

of

the
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comes a merchant himself under the provisions of this third category. Thus, the third category of merchants incorporates all of the
problems of the second category. It also creates the problem of determining who is an "agent," "broker" or "other intermediary" within the meaning of the provision. 4 There is little commentary on this
category.
III. THE FARMER-MERCHANT PROBLEM
A.

BACKGROUND

To date, the large majority of cases which have dealt with the
merchant or nonmerchant status of farmers have arisen out of disputes between farmers and local grain dealers over the existence
or the exact terms of an alleged contract for the sale of farm produce.4 7 In these cases, the farmer has usually been the defendant
in an action brought by a local grain elevator. The scenario in these
cases is often as follows. The elevator company alleges that it has
entered into an oral contract with the farmer whereby the farmer
agreed to deliver his crop for a set price on a future date. The
elevator company further alleges that the farmer has breached the
contract by selling the crop to a third party after rising grain prices
made the second sale more profitable. Since article 2 of the U.C.C.
applies to this transacton, 48 the farmer asserts that even if he did
enter into such an agreement, it is unenforceable under the Statute
of Frauds provision of section 2-201 (1) .'9 The elevator company, in
response, enters into evidence a memorandum of the transaction
which it had made and sent to the farmer, arguing that the receipt
of the memorandum, coupled with the farmer's failure to respond
thereto, removed the Statute of Frauds 0 as a defense, pursuant to
section 2-201 (2). The farmer's response is that he is not a merchant
and is thus not subject to section 2-201 (2). The issue then becomes;
is the farmer a merchant as defined in section 2-104 (1) ?51
46. Newell, supra note 18, at 328, suggests that perhaps many of the problems created
by this section may be solved by reference to the general principles of agency law.
47.

The

following

cases

concerned

the

existence

and

enforceability

of oral

contracts

under § 2-201(2); Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 19 U.C.C. Rep. (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19,
1976)
Continental Grain Co. v. Harbach, 400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975) ; Loeb & Co. v.
Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975); Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962,
395 S.W.2d 555 (1965) ; Sierens v. Clausen, 60 I1. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975) ; Campbell v. Yokel, 20 I1. App. 3d 702, 313 N.E.2d 628 (1974) ; Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219
Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976) ; Lish v. Compton, -Utah 2d-,
547 P.2d 223 (1976).

One case involved the offer and acceptance rule of § 2-207. Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40
Ohio App. 2d 203, 318 N.E.2d 428 (1973).

Fear Ranches, Inc. v.

Berry, 470 F.2d 905 (10th

Cir. 1972), Involved an implied warranty of merchantability under § 2-314.
48.

U.C.C.

§ 2-102

provides

in

part

as follows: "[Tjhis

Article

[Article 2] applies

to

transactions in goods." "Goods" are defined to mean "all things... which are moveable at
the time of identification to the contract for sale. . . . Goods also includes the unborn
young of animals and growing crops

....

" Id.

§ 2-105(1).

49.

See U.C.C. § 2-201, quoted in note 7 supra.
50. Id.
51. Even If defendant Is found to be a merchant. section 2-201

12)

takes from him
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The term "farmer" has been used thus far without any qualification or definlition. The cases also have failed to provide a detailed
definition. The label "farmer" has been applied indiscriminately to
a diverse group of individuals ranging from growers of soybeans 52
to persons involved primarily in cattle operations. 53 The "farmers"
in each case did, however, have several general characteristics in
common. The operations conducted by each were of a type which
could generally be described as "farming"; i.e., the cultivation of
crops or the raising of livestock. All the operations were commercial
enterprises as opposed to subsistence farming or mere hobbies. The
farmers in each case sold the produce which they had raised
themselves, and had not sold anything belonging to anyone else.
B.

HISTORICAL

RELATIONSHIPS

BETWEEN

FARMERS

AND

MER-

CHANTS

The comments accompanying the merchant provisions in the
U.C.C. state that the Code concept of a merchant has "roots in the
'law merchant' concept of a professional in business. 15 4 Some perspective on the proper relationship between modern farmers and the
U.C.C. merchant provisions might therefore be gained by an exploration of historical relationships between farmers and professionals in
business. That exploration, for historical reasons, must begin in Feudal England and follow through to present day United States.
1. English Farmers and Merchants
Farmers and merchants occupied positions which were far distant from one another in both the social and economic structures
of early Feudal England. The actual tillers of the soil were mem55
bers of the manor complex, the lowest rung on the feudal hierarchy.
The manor was a complete social, economic, and legal system. The
head of the manor was a minor feudal lord, who held a designated
tract of land which he had received from a higher lord by enfeoffment. The farmers or "vills" lived in small villages near the lord's
castle. The vills pledged their loyalty to the lord, and also pledged
to supply food and other farm products to fill the needs of the occupants of the castle. The lord in return provided the vills with military protection, and allowed them to remain on the land.
These feudal communities had their own courts, which were called
only the Statute of Frauds defense. The plaintiff still has the burden of proving

that an

oral contract did indeed exist. See U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 3.
52. Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975).
53. Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 52 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 1976) ; Ohio
Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 318 N.E.2d 428 (1973).; Fear Ranches, Inc.
v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972).
54. U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 2.
55.
V. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 96, 310 (5th ed. 1956).

596.
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manor courts.56 With the lord presiding, the manor courts had
jurisdiction over all disputes arising among the vills. They dealt, for
example, with all disputes arising out of the purchase or sale of farm
products."
The jurisdiction of the manor courts over the affairs of the vills
was total during the early period of feudalism. The royal court system generally refused to hear the vills' complaints. 5 Gradually, however, the royal courts began to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the
manor courts. By the end of the sixteenth century the jurisdiction
of the manor courts had been assumed totally by the Royal Court
of Common Pleas. 59
The merchants of the Middle Ages were domestic and international traders who traveled from city to city, selling their wares at
the great fairs which were the primary centers of trade. The early
common law made no special provisions for these peddlers, and their
disputes were subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts. As the
volume of commerce increased, however, itinerant merchants discovered a need for a special forum in which to litigate disputes arising out of the sale of their merchandise. They felt that the local
courts acted too slowly and favored the claims of local residents.
Because of the large amount of revenue generated by the merchants,
their requests for such a forum were honored. The courts of piepoudre were established to administer mercantile disputes through
the application of the customs and principles which had evolved in
the marketplace. 60 The courts of piepoudre dealt with many phases
of commerce including sales contracts, partnership law, negotiability
of bills of exchange, and warranties of quality and title. 61 The body
of law collected and applied in those mercantile courts was labeled
the "law merchant. ' ' 62 The law merchant was administered independently of the common law, and the mercantile courts functioned apart
from local courts, such as the manor courts. Gradually, however, the
jurisdiction of these courts, along with that of the manor courts, was
absorbed into the royal court system, and the63 principles of the law
merchant became a part of the common law.
2. American Farmers and Merchants
Although the early English farmer and the early English merchant had little in common, the conditions and opportunities present
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
F.
W.
F.

63. Id.

at 311.

WHITNEY, supra note 10, at 143.
PLUCKNETT, supra note 55, at 666-69.
WHITNEY, supra note 10, at 143.
at 144.
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in the New World combined to form an environment which required
a much closer relationship between the farmer and the merchant.
Most of the farms in early America were small, family operations. However, the rapid growth of the new country in both size
and technological ability gradually transformed the average farm
from a small, ,family operation to a full scale commercial enterprise.6 4 The introduction of cotton, tobacco, and slaves made large
one-crop farming operations feasible and profitable.6 5 The availability of vast quantities of cheap land in the Midwest, along with the
development of railroad lines to ship produce to urban markets, encouraged the growth of large cattle raising operations. 6 The Industrial Revolution with its need for factory labor and the growth of
many new towns along expanding railroad lines created many urban
job opportunities and lured many persons away from the family
farms and into the cities.6 7 The net result was that a relatively
small number of farmers were left on vast tracts of land to fill
the needs of a burgeoning urban population. 8
Farmers were able to meet the demands of urban dwellers with
newly developed farm machinery and farming techniques and by
substantially increasing the size of their operations. Accompanying
the increase in size of operation were all the complexities of the
modern business world. Financing was necessary to obtain efficient
equipment and necessary supplies. Contracts for insurance and employment had to be negotiated. Farming in general had become a
business, and the farmer necessarily had become a sophisticated
business manager.6 9
From colonial times until the early 1900's, commercial law was
accorded no special treatment and no legal distinction was made between merchants and nonmerchants. 70 As commerce among the
states grew during the Industrial Revolution, the development of different laws in the various jurisdictions caused a great deal of confusion among persons engaged in interstate trade. 7' Several states,
in an attempt to minimize that confusion, enacted uniform commer64. One commentator on the American farm industry has. said as follows: "In an earlier
and simpler day, farm people lived somewhat in economic isolation from urban centers.
This has become less true with each recent decade, and today is hardly true at all. The
economic affairs of farmers are now related intimately to the economic lives of urban
dwellers. E. BENSON, FARMERS AT THE CROSSROADs 7 (1st ed. 1956).
65. R. LORD, THE CARE OF THE EARTH, A HISTORY OF HUSBANDRY 206 (1st ed. 1962).
66. Id. at 208.
67. Id. at 211.
68. Id.
69. H. HANNAH, LAW ON THE FARM 288 (1st ed. 1948).
70. See supra note 17.
71. Until the late 1800's there were no federal statutory schemes or uniform laws among
the states In the area of commercial law. As a result, the development of the law was
within the power of the states and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis effectively limited the
effect of a court's decisions to the boundaries of the state in which it sat. The Industrial
Revolution, however, made commerce a predominantly interstate activity and confusion in
the commercial law was the result. See Hawkland, U.C.C. Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F.
291, 294. See also F. WHITNEY, supra note 10, at 145.
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cial laws. 72 However, those laws still made no distinction between
merchants and nonmerchants. The National Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws collaborated in 1945 to design a scheme of laws to repeal and replace
the early uniform commercial laws which had become obsolete. The
result was: the Uniform Commercial Code with its unique merchant
provisions.

73

C. APPROACHES TAKEN BY THE COURTS TO THE FARMER-MERCHANT

QUESTION
A court faced with the problem of applying a statute to an individual or group which is neither specifically included nor excluded
by the language of that statute has at least two routes by which it
can proceed to its ultimate decision. One route is to find simply that
a literal reading of the language compels inclusion or exclusion. The
other is to base the decision upon considerations uther than the statutory language itself; for example, the intent of the drafters of the
statute, legislative intent, and general policy considerations. Both
methods have been utilized by the courts which have dealt with the
farmer-merchant question.
1. Literal Interpretation of the Code Language
a. Dealer in Goods of the Kind
The main question with respect to this category, posed by the
typical farmer-merchant situation, is whether a person who does no
more than annually sell the produce which he has raised is a dealer
with respect to that produce. In other words, are mere annual sales
a sufficient basis from which to impute a professional status, with
respect to the goods sold, to the seller?
The courts which have specifically addressed this issue have taken
two approaches. The first approach is summary disposition of
the question, with little support for the conclusion reached. 74 For
example, in Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner75 the Supreme Court of Alabama merely stated that it did not believe that the fact that a farmer sold his crop every year was sufficient to take him out of the
category of casual seller and place him in the category of professionals. 76 In that-case defendant was a cotton farmer who had been
72.

Uniform Negotiable

Instruments Law enacted

In 1896; Uniform

Act enacted in 1906; Uniform Sales Act enacted in 1906; Uniform

Warehouse Receipts

Bills of Lading Act

enacted in 1909.
73. F. WHITNEY, supra note 10, at 149.
74. See generally Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975) ; Cook
Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965) ; Campbell v. Yokel, 20 Il1. App.
547 P.2d 223 (1976).
2d-,
3d 702, 313 N.E.2d 628 (1974) : Lish v. Compton, -Utah
75. 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975).
321 So. 2d) at 202.
76. Id. at -,
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engaged in the growing and sale of cotton and other crops for thirteen years.7 7 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Cook
Grains, Inc. v. Fallis78 'stated succinctly as follows: "There is not a
scintilla of evidence in the record . . . that the appellee is a dealer
in goods of the kind.''79 The record showed that appellee grew soybeans on a 550 acre tract and was a "farmer and nothing else." '8 0
Two courts have progressed a step beyond the simple "does or
does not deal" approach taken by the first group of courts, and
have developed a simple test to aid in the interpretation of the
dealer category. Under their view, the question of whether or not
an individual deals in a product is to be determined by reference
to the regularity with which he engages in its sale. To be a dealer
one must sell a particular product on a regular basis. However, even
the two courts taking this approach differ in their opinions as to
whether or not mere annual sales of a product are sales on a regular basis. In Lish v. Compton," the Supreme Court of Utah determined that a person who sells his products with such regularity
as to make the selling a substantial part of his occupation should
be labeled a merchant. 82 But the court went on to hold that a person who had raised and sold hay and grain for twenty-five years
did not fit the requirement of that test.8 3 The Illinois Appellate Court
in Campbell v. Yokel 8 4 stated that persons who regularly market
their crops are dealers as to those crops.8 5 The court felt that defendants who had raised and sold soybeans and grains annually for
several years were in the business of raising and selling, and conse86
quently were merchants.
A further question with respect to the dealer category of merchant has been raised in one farmer-merchant case. Once the court
has determined that a party deals in one particular product, can it
use that fact as the basis for concluding that the party is a mer'chant with respect to the single sale of a product which is different
from, but similar to the one in which he deals? For example, can
the fact that a defendant -is indisputably a dealer in corn serve to
make him a dealer with respect to a single sale of cattle?
The single farmer case which has faced this issue has, in effect,
held that the products involved must be nearly identical before prior
dealing in one article 'or item can be made to serve as the basis
77.
78.
79.
S0.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at - , 321 So. 2d at 200.
239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W .2d 555 (1965).
Id. at-,
395 S.W.2d at 556.
Id. at -395 S.W.2d at 556.
-Utah
2d-,
54.7 P.2d 223 (1976).
Id. at , 547 P.2d at 226.
Id. at -.
547 P.2d at 225-26.
20 Ill.
App. 3d 702, 313 N.E.2d 628 (1974).
Id. at 705, 313 N.E.2d at 630.
Id.
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for imposition of dealer status with respect to another article or item.
In Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry,"7 plaintiff sought to impose an implied warranty of merchantability upon cattle sold to him by defendant Berry. Although Berry was in the business of selling cattle to
meat packers on a regular basis, and was therefore arguably a dealer with respect to those sales, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that he was not a dealer with respect to a single sale of
cattle for breeding purposes because the products involved were "too
different." 88
b. He Who by His Occupation Holds Himself Out as Having
Skill or Knowledge Peculiar to the Practices or Goods
Involved in the Transaction
The courts which have dealt with this category of merchants can
be separated into two categories, based on the approach taken. The
first approach can generally be described as an objective, or categorical, approach. The courts which use this method appear to determine first to which occupational class the defendant belongs (e.g.,
farmer, dentist, automobile salesman, etc.). Once the defendant is
classified, they determine, objectively, what activities and/or goods
are ordinarily incident to that occupation. Then, only with respect
to those activities and goods which the court feels are an intimate
part of the defendant's occupation, can a defendant be held to merchant status, regardless of his actual knowledge or experience.
The courts which have taken this approach have uniformly held
that a farmer is not a merchant under this category. The general
theory applied by these courts appears to be that the sale of farm
products is n'ot such an integral part of the occupation of farming
that mere involvement in farming constitutes a representation of any
type of special skill or knowledge with respect to those sales. In
other words, a farmer when selling his produce is acting outside
the scope of his mercantile capacity, regardless of the fact that he
actually may have a working knowledge of market operations and
0
sales practices.8 9 In Decatur Cooperative Association v. Urban,1
the
Supreme Court of Kansas found that a defendant who had been engag87. 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972).
88. The court said as follows: "It is not sufficient to say that Berry [defendant] had
always dealt in 'cattle,' as such a category includes too many entirely different 'goods.'
Id. at 907.
89. The court In Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975), stated
as follows: "We conclude that a farmer does not solely by his occupation hold himself
out as being a professional cotton merchant". Id. at -,
321 So. 2d at 202. In Lish v.
Compton, -Utah
2d-,
547 P.2d 223 (1976), the court stated as follows: "The fact
that defendant kept conversant with the current price of wheat and planned to market
If this would make
it to his advantage does not necessarily make him a 'merchant'....
one a 'merchant', then practically anyone who sold anything would be deemed a merchant ....
" Id. at -,
547 P.2d at 225.
90. 219 Kan. 171. 547 P.2d 323 (1976).
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ed in wheat farming for twenty years and was farming and running
livestock on 2,320 acres was not a merchant with respect to the sale
of wheat. 9 1 The rationale for the decision was that special knowledge
in raising wheat, coupled with annual sales of crops and annual purchases of seed, do not make a farmer a merchant, absent evidence
that he was involved in any transactions other than cash sales to
local elevators. This could conceivably be viewed as requiring a level
of expertise capable of being defined as professional.9 2 The Illinois Appellate Court in Sierens v. Clausen9 3 simply stated
that a farmer who is in the business 'of growing rather than merchandising grain is a casual seller, not a merchant.9 4 In Loeb &
Co. v. Schreiner95 the court stated that the mere fact that defendant
is an astute farmer who sells his cotton crop each year should not
be enough to take him out of the general category of casual seller
and place him in the category of professionals, in the absence of
any evidence that he sold anyone's crops but his own.9
A second group of courts has taken a much, more subjective, or
case-by-case approach. Instead of classifying the defendant as a farmer and then proceeding to consider the general character of farming, these courts examine the actual knowledge and experience that
the defendant has acquired. If he has acquired knowledge of, or has
been exposed to particular goods or practices in the course of pursuing his occupation or livelihood, these courts have held as a matter of law that he represents or holds himself out as having special
knowledge as to those goods or practices. For example, if the individual farmer, through the sales of his products, has actually become
acquainted with the practices, customs, and operation of the sales
markets, the courts taking this second approach readily find that he,
by his occupation, represents that he has special knowledge of those
customs and practices. This general attitude is well illustrated by
the statement of the Illinois federal district court in Continental
Grain Co. v. Harbach as follows: "The decision in Sierens v. Clausen
[the Illinois Supreme Court opinion reversing the Illinois Appellate
Court's decision] commands an appraisal of defendant's circumstances to determine whether his experience and knowledge subject
him to the obligations of merchants." 9 The only operations which
these courts appear to require the farmer to have experienced in order to be classified as a merchant are the very general practices
involved in the sale of farm products; for example, grading, weigh91. Id. at 177," 547 P.2d at 32S-329.
92. Id.
93. 21 Il1. App. 3d 450, 315 N.E.2d 897 (1974). rev'd, 60 Ill. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559
(1975).
94. 21 Ill. App. 3d at 452, 315 N.E.2d at 898-99.
95. 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975).
96. Id. at , 321 So. 2d' at 202.
97. 400 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. I11. 1975). Several other courts have taken an approach

602

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

ing, the general practice of contracting for sale, and the opening
and answering of business mail.98
This second approach effectively eliminates many arguments of
a potential farmer-defendant for exclusion from this category of merchant. For example, if the key to inclusion is the defendant's actual
experience, the attempt to distinguish the selling aspect of farming
from the production aspect is meaningless. If all that is required is
a familiarity with the general practices of selling farm products, a
defendant will be unable to escape merchant status by claiming that
he has had no experience with a specific good or sales transaction.
For example, a farmer who raises mainly soybeans will not be able
to disclaim merchant status when he sells corn.9 9 In fact, one case
has carried the theory so far as to hold that a farmer involved
primarily with livestock was a merchant with respect to a single
sale of corn, because the general practices involved in selling livestock are similar to those involved in grain marketing. 100
much the same. In Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 318 N.R.2d 428
(1973), the court decided as follows: "Defendant was clearly familiar with farm markets
and their operation and followed them with some care." Id. at
, 318 N.E.2d at 430.
This general approach is also well illustrated by the analysis of the situation by the
court in Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975).
[D]efendant had been engaged in farming for 34 years, that at that time he
had under cultivation approximately 180 acres of corn and 150 acres of soybeans, and that for a period of at least five years he had sold his crops to
grain elevators both In "cash sales" and "futures contracts."
. . . The practice of grain and soybean growers In selling their products . . .
Is well known and widely followed. . . . We know of no reason why under
the circumstances shown here, the defendant . . . cannot at the time of the
sale be a merchant.
Id. at 588-589, 328 N.E.2d at 561.
The court in Continental Grains v. Rarbach, 4.00 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975),
made the basis for its decision clear. "Our decision rests on defendant's familiarity with
the business practices involved ..
" Id. at 700.
98. In Ohio Grain v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 318 N.E.2d 428 (1973), a case
in which the dispute concerned an alleged contract for the sale of soybeans, the court
dispensed with defendant-farmer's argument that he had no knowledge of the specific
practices involved in the sale of soybeans as follows:
He [defendant] claims to be a livestock farmer rather than, a grain farmer.
The price obtained in a livestock market also varies with the quality and
condition of the animal. It is inconceivable that he would not know that it
is the exceptional produce or livestock which brings top market price and
that neither is to be accepted at top price without examination and analysis.
Id. at -,
318 N.E.2d at 430.
In Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 52 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 1976), the court
stated as follows:
It is immaterial that defendants may not have been familiar with all aspects
of the futures market. All that they are charged with knowing, as merchants
in this transaction., is the practice of opening and answering mail. As owners
and operators of an extensive farming operation, defendants were in a position in which it was reasonable for others to assume that they would have
acquired knowledge of such practice.
Id. at 59.
99. In Continental Grain Co. v. Harbach, 400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975), the courl
said as follows:
Nevertheless, defendant's lack of experience in selling soybeans alone is not
enough to refute his status as a merchant. One reason is that defendant
has failed to show that corn and soybeans are too different to be goods of
the same kind. . . . Defendant is certainly a merchant as to sales of corn.
Id. at 699.
100. Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, , 318 N.E.2d 428, 430 (1973).
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c. Employment of an Agent, Broker, or Other Intermediary
This category has received scant attention in the farmer cases.
Whether this is because the courts have simply overlooked the possibility or because there has been no one who could arguably qualify as an agent, broker, or other intermediary, is not ascertainable.
The only farmer case which has mentioned this category even briefly said that it might be reasonable to charge the defendant-farmer
with merchant status because he employed a bookkeeper who, because of prior experience, could be presumed to have knowledge of
1 1
the general business practice of opening and answering mail.'
2. Considerations in Addition to Literal Interpretation of the
Language
Although the decision in each farmer case has been based on
interpretation of the Code language, dicta in several opinions indicates that there are several other factors which influenced the ultimate conclusion.
a. Intent of the Drafters and the "Plain Meaning Rule"
One additional factor considered by some courts is the probable
intent of the drafters of the U.C.C. However, different courts have
drawn conflicting inferences as; to that intent. Three courts have
stated that they "did not believe that the drafters intended farmers
to come within the scope of the merchant provisions.'' 1 0 2 One of those
courts cites no authority, nor provides any reason to support that
conclusion. 0 3 The other two courts merely feel that it would be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word "merchant" to include
farmers.° 4
The Wisconsin federal district court in Continental Grain Co. v.
Brown'0 5 expressly rejected the position that farmers were not intended to be treated as merchants as follows:
Nothing in the Uniform Commercial Code or in the Official
Comment indicates that the framers of the Code contemplated exempting farmers as a class from the definition of
"merchant." In fact, all the indications are otherwise. In other
sections of the code, special exceptions or rules were created
for farmers or farm products. . . . There is no exception
for farmers in the statute defining merchant or in the Stat101.

Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 52, 58 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 1976).

, 321 So. 2d 199, 201 (1975); Cook
102. Loeb & Co. v. Schrei.ner, 294 Ala. 722, , 395 S.W.2d 555, 557 (1965); Lish v. Compton,
.Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, -Utah
2d-,
-,
547 P.2d 223, 226 (1976).
, 321 So. 2d 199, 201 (1975).
103. Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, , 395 S.W.2d 555, 557 (1965) ; Lish v.
104. Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, (1976).
226
547 P.2d 223,
-,
2d-,
Compton, -Utah
105. 19 U.C.C. Rep. 52 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 1976).
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ute of Frauds. Moreover, "crops"

are defined as "goods"

106

b. Public Policy Considerations
One court has proposed that policy considerations require farmers
to be excluded from the merchant category. The Illinois Appellate
Court in Sierens v. Clausen"°7 believed that to require an inquiry into
the extent of a person's knowledge on the mere allegation that he is
a farmer would be "potentially disruptive" to farming operations. 108
However, the court provided no rationale for its conclusion.
Several courts have taken a policy view very different from that
of the Sierens court, and have determined that equity requires inclusion of farmers in the merchant category. These courts support
the theory that the burden of imposition of merchant status upon
farmers is small when compared to the burden which might fall on
those persons with whom they frequently deal should the courts fail
to hold farmers to merchant status. 10 9
IV. EFFECT OF MAKING FARMERS MERCHANTS
A finding that farmers in general are merchants will have a significant effect upon that class of businessmen. Although length prohibits examination of all thirteen sections which utilize the merchant
concept,"10 an examination of three of the sections is illustrative.
First, everyone involved in a transaction subject to article 2 is
required to deal in good faith."' In the case of a nonmerchant, good
faith means honesty in fact. Merchants, in addition, are bound to observe the "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade. ' '1112 Farmers, as merchants, thus will be bound to observe and
honor the reasonable customs and trade practices involved in the
agricultural industry, including those of buying and selling farm products.
Second, in the context of the Statute of Frauds memorandum exception of section 2-201 (2),1' imposition of merchant status merely
requires that a farmer-merchant object to any memorandum which
purports to represent an agreement which he in fact did not enter
into or is not an accurate representation of an agreement he did
make. 1 4 Even if he fails to object, he only loses the Statute of Frauds
106. Id. at 58.
107. 21 II. App. 3d 450, 315 N.E.2d 897 (1974), rev'd, 60 II. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559
(1975).
108. Id. at 453, 315 N.E.2d at 899.
109. Continental Grain Co. v. Brown, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 52, 60 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 1976)
Campbell v. Yokel, 20 Ill. App. 3d 702, 705, 313 N.E.2d 628, 630 (1974).
110. See supra note 5.
111. U.C.C. § 1-203.
112. U.C.C. § 2-103(b).
113. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
114. Id.
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as a defense."' The burden 'of proving the existence and the terms
of the alleged oral contract lies upon the other party. 116 This means
that a farmer will not be able to make an oral agreement to deliver his crop at a future date, wait and watch market price fluctuations, and finally deliver his crop to whomever agrees to pay the
highest price. This, in fact, is one of the specific abuses that the
1 7
Code drafters desired to eliminate. 1
Third, section 2-314 would require farmers as merchants to perform contracts of sale by supplying products of a quality which conforms to that generally accepted in the farming industry,"', or expressly state that their products do not so conform." 9
V. CONCLUSION
Although the merchant provisions appear simple upon first reading, they can be difficult to apply. Little guidance concerning the exact
interpretation of the three categories of merchant can be gleaned
from either the surrounding body of case law or the legislative history of the provisions. This difficulty and the lack of clear guidance
have caused courts ,to take different approaches to the interpretation
of the merchant provisions and arrive at conflicting results with respect to the applicability of merchant status to farmers.
Careful consideration of the nature of the modern American farming industry leads to -the conclusion that an average farmer should
be classified as a merchant under both of the first two categories
of merchants. The third category of merchant, involving the employment of an agent, broker, or other intermediary, is applicable to the
farmer only if some sort of agency relationship is first found. If
an agency exists, the determination of merchant status will turn upon
the same variables, considered when applying the standards of the
second category; namely, is there a holding out, by virtue of one's
occupation, that one has the requisite peculiar skill or knowledge.
The farmer who raises crops or livestock on a yearly or seasonal
basis, and who regularly sells his products, should be classified as a
dealer in goods of the kind. Clearly, a commercial farmer contemplates the marketing of his produce. Anything produced that is not
consumed personally will undoubtedly be sold. A producer who depends upon the successful sale of his product for his livelihood certainly is not a casual seller. Neither is the annual sale of his prod;uct an isolated sale in the sense of a sale made infrequently and
115.
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out of the line of the seller's ordinary course of business. Thus, for
the purpose of the first, or dealer, category of merchant, a farmer
should be considered a merchant.
The farmer should also be found to be a merchant under the
second category, as one who by his occupation holds himself out as
having skill or knowledge peculiar to the practices or goods involved
in the transaction. The result should be the same under both approaches used to determine merchant status under this category, the
121
categorical approach 120 and the subjective approach.
If the categorical, or objective, approach to interpretation of the
second category of merchant is taken, one important general aspect
of the occupation of farming must be noted. That is, notwithstanding
the fact that a majority of the average farmer's time and effort is
devoted to the actual production of his product, the successful marketing of the final product is a crucial factor in the success and continuance of the entire operation. It is not realistic to maintain, in
view of that fact, that a typical farmer does not ordinarily possess
a thorough familiarity with market operations and procedures by
which his commodities must be sold. A farmer must be aware of
these practices in order to obtain the greatest possible return on his
tremendous investment of time and money. It is therefore most reasonable to conclude that sales of farm products are an integral
part of the occupation of farming, and that the farmer should be
chargeable with the knowledge of common sales practices.
The conclusion that a farmer by his occupation represents that
he has special knowledge of practices involved in the sale of his produce is even more clearly supported when using the case-by-case, or
subjective, approach. An examination of the background 'of any person
who manages a solvent farm operation must necessarily reveal at
least a working knowledge of local market operations and sales procedures.
Although in earlier times there might have been significant differences between the business acumen of a typical farmer and that
of an urban businessman, any differences which exist today are
small. The overall effect of imposition of merchant status upon the
typical American farmer will be to place him on an equal footing
with the businessman with whom he commonly deals on a commercial level. The conclusion that farmers are professionals with respect
to both the products they raise and the common practices involved
in the sale of those products is commercially reasonable and technically correct.
Russ
120.
121.
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See supra notes 89-97, and text accompanying.
See supra notes 98-101, and text accompanying.

